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Abstract. We live in a “post-neoliberal world”, as it has been discussed in the mainstream literature, 
but the vital link between neoliberalism and neopopulism has been rarely discussed. Nowadays in 
international political science it is very fashionable to criticise the long neoliberal period of the last 
decades, still its effect on the rise of neopopulism has not yet been properly elaborated. To dig deeper 
into social background of neopopulism, this paper describes the system of neoliberalism in its three 
major social subsystems, in the socio-economic, legal-political and cultural-civilizational fields. The 
historical context situates the dominant period of neoliberalism between the 1970s in the Old World 
Order (OWO) and in the 2010s in the New World Order (NWO). In general, neoliberalism’s cumu-
lative effects of increasing inequality has produced the current global wave of neopopulism that will 
be analysed in this paper in its ECE regional version. The neopopulist social paradox is that not only 
the privileged strata, but also the poorest part of ECE’s societies supports the hard populist elites. Due 
to the general desecuritization in ECE, the poor have become state dependent for social security, yet 
paradoxically they vote for their oppressors, widening the social base of this competitive authoritarian-
ism. Thus, the twins of neoliberalism and neopopulism, in their close connections—the main topic 
of this paper—have produced a “cultural backlash” in ECE along with identity politics, which is high 
on the political agenda.
Key words: New World Order, nature of neoliberalism, post-neoliberal world, desecuritization and 
nativist identity politics
„There is no such thing as society” 
(Margaret Thatcher, 31 October 1987)
TINA – There is no alternative 
(The famous dictum of Margaret Thatcher)
Introduction: the conceptual framework and periodization of neoliberalism
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Introduction: the conceptual framework and periodization of neoliberalism
In the international literature, there have been more and more warnings that nowadays all chal-
lenges to democracy are being called populist, therefore the conceptual clarity of populism is fading 
away. To avoid conceptual stretching, I have insisted in my former papers on the major differences 
among its regional varieties and I have concentrated on the ECE/NMS regional variety of populism. 
The situation has been even worse in the case of neoliberalism, since in a huge amount of the 
literature there have been many—at least partly—contradicting approaches. Many analysts have 
declared that it is an “amorphous” subject, or a “slippery” or “shifting” concept (Rodrik, 2017), 
lacking any clear definition. Although the term is too large and too vague, since it has embraced a 
large variety of social processes and sectors, at the same time it properly systematized the common 
features of the societal structure (O’Neill and Weller, 2016, pp.84,88). In fact, despite the whirl-
ing of many definitions and approaches, the core of neoliberalism is clear: the minimal state and 
maximal market. With due simplification, neoliberalism can be defined as a special kind of social 
system, popular discourse, and approach of social sciences based on market fundamentalism.1
Neoliberalism has developed into a comprehensive social system, since it has embraced and 
transformed all social subsystems according to its internal logic. Therefore, in this paper, I focus 
on the neoliberal wold in three—socio-economic, legal-political, and cultural-civilizational—di-
mensions, resulting, as a reaction of losers, in the emergence of neopopulism. First, this paper 
investigates the general features of neoliberalism in its three dimensions and two historical 
stages—before and after the global crisis—in the global world based on recent international 
literature. Second, it describes a special type of ECE neoliberalism in its first wave, generating the 
“populism from below” or soft populism provoked by increasing inequality with social polarization 
and marginalization in ECE. Third, it analyses the second wave of neoliberalism in ECE producing 
the “populism from above” or hard populism resulting from the missing crisis resilience of ECE 
countries and the evident failure of the catching-up process in the 2010s. This hard populism 
developed a cultural and nativist profile, in which identity politics gains an upper hand, and can 
be discussed as a counter-ideology against the neoliberalism.2
Neoliberalism has been often mistaken for and identified with classical liberalism— and vice 
versa—though they are very different as a result of a long divergence process. This long process 
has been carefully studied in many papers, starting from the late nineteenth-century and cul-
minating in the 1930s, when Hayek elaborated the first version of neoliberalism and Friedman 
completed it (Nik-Khah and Van Horn, 2016). This early version may be called “neo-liberalism” to 
indicate the difference between this “prehistory” and its mature version introduced in the 1970s. 
While neo-liberalism only means a set of theoretical approaches, the neoliberalism succeeding 
1  Most analysts agree on this common substance of neoliberalism, see first of all the most comprehensive 
overview of neoliberalism, the Routledge Handbook of Neoliberalism, (Springer et al, 2016), (See also Cahill et al, 
2018). Centeno and Cohen (2012) have used the term “the arc of neoliberalism” to express this comprehensive 
character and common substance of neoliberalism in various social sectors.
2  This paper continues my former analysis of neopopulism (Ágh, 2016, 2017a,b and 2018) in two directions, 
first by pointing out the reasons for the eruption of neopopulism in ECE, and second, by widening its analysis in 
the field of cultural or identity politics, in both respects, in the ECE case. While there is a vast amount of literature 
on populism, the critical analysis of neoliberalism has been less elaborated in the international political science, 
therefore this paper tries to contribute to its presentation.
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the period of the welfare state has basically transformed Western societies. Moreover, the main 
tenet of liberalism is that social sectors have their own internal logic in their interactions; thus 
Polanyi emphasizes: liberalism has assisted at the elaboration of social science disciplines in their 
autonomy or according to their inherent logic in the economy, political science and sociology. 
Stiglitz (2001) has pointed out their interrelatedness, “Polanyi saw the market as part of broader 
economy, and the broader economy as part of a still broader society.” Neoliberalism, in turn, 
considers, by monopolizing the market logic, that the economic science is the only real social sci-
ence, the “natural science” among all social sciences, since market acts “like the force of nature”. 
Therefore, it denies the autonomy of other social sciences; they are only derivates of the logic of 
the market economy. Similarly, although liberalism introduced and later developed several “gen-
erations” of human rights, neoliberalism is based on the strict version of “homo oeconomicus”, 
the isolated individual with rational choice.3
In Western societies the last decades of the twentieth-century were a period of “neoliberal 
hegemony” (Plehwe, 2016). It began in the 1970s with “a sharp line of social, political and intellec-
tual discontinuity . . . so that we can think of the last quarter of the 20th century as a new historical 
realm” as Claus Offe (2018, p.74) notes. Western Europe went through unprecedented economic 
growth in three decades after WWII—a period usually called the “thirty golden years”—but in the 
1970s the resources of the transition to the service economy were exhausted, parallel with the 
first wave of globalization, hence the oil crisis aggravated that of the welfare state (Temin, 2002; 
Vaughan-Whitehead, 2010). As a reaction to this crisis, the neoliberal world expanded, in general, 
it turned into a global system. This transformation of the West was continued and copied in the 
Western-dominated world, rather brutally in Latin America (Pinochet in Chile, see Baer and Love, 
2000 and Grugel and Riggirozzi, 2009).4
Neoliberalism changed a lot in these decades, from the rigid structure in the holy trinity of 
liberalization, deregulation, and privatization formulated in the Washington Consensus in November 
1989. It was considered the symbol of US global dominance with its global fiscal institutions like 
the World Bank and the IMF. The Washington Consensus peaked in the early 1990s, and it was 
symbolized later, by the annual meetings in Davos. In 1971, the European Management Forum 
was formed and transformed in 1987 into the World Economic Forum (WEF), which has produced 
annual reports and organized meetings in Davos involving leading politicians and experts world-
wide. Instead of closed and rigid system of Washington Consensus, the WEF or “Davos” period has 
shown the dynamic and open face of neoliberalism, since it has regularly reformed its conceptual 
framework and has opened to the communicative space of the international media and scholar-
3  From the literature on neoliberalism, this paper relies on the work of the following authors: Birch (2015), 
Birch and Mykhnenko (2010), Bresser-Pereira (2010), Crouch (2017), England and Ward (2016), Gerbaudo (2016), 
Graefe (2016), Harvey (2005, 2007), Kotz (2015), Leshem (2016), Mitchell and Fazi (2017a,b), Müller (2018), Ostry 
et al (2016), Steger and Roy (2010), Stein (2008), Vidra (2018) and Whiteside (2016).
4  Offe has also pointed out that neoliberalism is a typical Anglo-Saxon product, and in the Routledge Hand-
book, Bob Jessop (2016) has written a chapter about this “heartland” of neoliberalism. The Anglo-Saxon countries 
have been mostly hit by the global crisis, and the pernicious consequences have appeared first of all in the “white” 
middle class turning precariate: “In 2008, 53 per cent of Americans self-identified themselves as being middle class, 
with another 25 per cent associating themselves with the lower middle class category. But by 2014, the former 
figure dropped to 44 per cent, while the latter rose to 40 per cent.” (Eagleton-Pierce, 2016, p.24).
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ship. In 2015 WEF was qualified as a non-profit, non-governmental international organization, and 
with its Global Competitiveness Reports it has significantly contributed to the detailed analysis of 
the sustainable development. Paradoxically, it represents both the multipolar neoliberal global-
ism and the dynamic, crisis-resilient factors going beyond the logic of this neoliberal world. It is 
not by chance that in the last years the criticism of post-neoliberalism has focused on Davos (see 
Alemanno, 2018, Báez Mosquiera, 2018 and Standing, 2016a,b,c).
These “thirty terrible years” have produced many losers, deep social problems, increasing 
social inequality that turned out to be the main obstacle of economic development. It has also 
created widespread populism and Euroscepticism in Western Europe, and world-wide discontent 
erupted during the global fiscal crisis and its aftermath. Thus, the global fiscal crisis, starting in 
the late 2000s, introduced the period of “post-neoliberalism”. As a reaction to neoliberalism, in 
the 2010s, a new form of populism emerged and the stage of neopopulism has begun. In such a 
way, the periodization of neoliberalism provides the backbone for an explanation of the difference 
between generations of populism and neopopulism.
The nature of neoliberalism in its three social subsystems
In the seventies, the neoliberal social system appeared step-by-step in West European societies 
in all the three social subsystems, as a self-reinforcing process between these dimensions. The 
increasing crisis of neoliberalism in the 2000s and its climax in the 2010s resulted in a Polanyi 
renaissance—with frequent references to his work (see Hopkin, 2017; Smith, 2017). Since the 
oeuvre of Karl Polanyi has been the classical counterpoint to the neoliberal approach, describing 
the relationship between the market economy and the “self-defence of society”. Joseph Stiglitz 
offers a concise summary of Polanyi’s theory in his foreword to the 2001 edition of The Great 
Transformation (1944), already in the spirit of the strong criticism of the neoliberal ideology 
following the arguments of Polanyi. Stiglitz emphasizes that Polanyi’s ideas “have not lost their 
salience”, namely “Among his central theses are the ideas that self-regulating markets never 
work”. Their deficiencies are big in their internal workings, and even more in their disastrous social 
consequences, therefore “government intervention becomes necessary”. Altogether, “Polanyi’s 
analysis makes it clear that popular doctrine of trickle-down economics—that all, including the 
poor, benefit from growth—have little historical support.” (Stiglitz, 2001, p.VII). Altogether, “Po-
lanyi exposes the myth of the free market: there never was a truly free, self-regulating market 
system.” (Stiglitz, 2001, p.XIII).
In The Great Transformation, Polanyi offers a comprehensive analysis of social transformation 
in the nineteenth- and twentieth-century: “Social history in the nineteenth century was thus the 
result of a double movement: the extension of the market organization . . . on the other hand the 
network of measures and policies was integrated into powerful institutions designed to check the 
action of the market relative to labor, land and money.” (Polanyi, 2001,79). He argues that the 
emergence of the market economy also generated the “self-defence of society”, as “a movement 
of self-preservation”. Society created the proper legal-political institutions and all kinds of social 
and cultural measures to regulate the market and counterbalance its disastrous effect. Polanyi 
has used very strong statements to express the dangers of the unregulated market: “To allow the 
10
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market mechanism to be the sole director of fate of human beings and their natural environment 
. . . would result in the demolition of society . . . In disposing of a man’s labor power the system 
would, incidentally, dispose of the physical, psychological, and moral entity ‘man’ attached to that 
tag. Robbed of the protective covering of cultural institutions, human being would perish from 
the effects of social exposure” (Polanyi, 2001, 76). It is no wonder that Polanyi has been followed 
and often quoted during the crisis period of neoliberalism, when – as Stiglitz (2001, p.X) points 
out, “the myth of self-regulating economy is, today, virtually, dead.” Moreover, it has turned out 
that increasing social polarization and decreasing wages for the larger part of society were the 
main reasons behind the slow economic growth.5
Like Polanyi, mainstream post-neoliberal literature characterizes neoliberalism as “economic 
imperialism”. William Davies-Goldsmiths departs from the contrast between liberalism and neolib-
eralism, and arrives at the market fundamentalism of the latter: “The achievement of nineteenth 
century liberalism was to produce a sense of economic activity as separate from and external to 
social and political activity”, unlike neoliberalism, since “A defining trait of neoliberalism is that 
it abandons this liberal conceit of separate economic, social and political spheres, evaluating all 
three according to a single economic logic . . . the basic assumption that all action is principally 
economic action is common to all neoliberal styles of theory . . .  Within the academy neoliberalism 
has been characterized by aggressive economic ‘imperialism’” (2017, pp.21-22).
Many authors have also argued that although neoliberalism emerged in developed democra-
cies, it still contained authoritarian, antidemocratic tendencies. The mainstream literature on 
neoliberalism in the 2010s has presented this tendency as an inherent danger for democracy 
due both to rising authoritarian neoliberalism in the global crisis management and by damaging 
human and social capital (Peters, 2016). Its political version was often called neoconservativism, 
and these neoconservative governments undertook the neoliberal economic measures: the drastic 
reduction of social or welfare systems and the privatization of public services (MacLeavy, 2016, 
pp.253-254). The victory of the “neoliberal agenda” was accompanied by and combined with 
radical state interventions, hence “state-directed coercion insulated from democratic pressures 
is central to the creation and maintenance of this politico-economic order, defending it against 
impulses toward greater equality and democratization.” (Bruff, 2016, p.107). Thus, the principle 
of the “market alone” was false, since the birth pangs of the neoliberal era were politically man-
aged, and its crisis also came to the surface as an eruption of political anger about deepening 
social polarization.
By focusing on the internal contradiction of neoliberalism, Jason Hickel (2016, p.142), has 
even mentioned “the end of democracy” or a “democratic backlash”: “A contradiction lies at 
the very centre of the neoliberal project. On a theoretical level, neoliberalism promises to bring 
about a purer form of democracy, unsullied by the tyranny of the state . . .  But, in practice, it 
becomes clear that the opposite is true: that neoliberalism tends to undermine democracy and 
political freedom”. This line of argument emphasizes that “opposite to the rhetoric of neoliberal 
5  The increasing inequality is well-known from the works of Thomas Piketty (see with Alvaredo, 2018), but it 
has also been discussed in several chapters of the Handbook (2016) and by Milanovic (2016a,b). The European Par-
liament (2017) passed a resolution on 16 November 2017 on combating inequalities as a lever to boost job creation 
and growth.
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ideology”, there was a close connection between the victory of neoliberalism and the crisis of 
representative democracy during those decades: “the history of the past 40 years suggests a dif-
ferent story: namely that the erosion of democracy has been a necessary political precondition 
for the implementation of neoliberal economic policy. In other words: radical market deregula-
tion has required the dismantling or circumvention of the very democratic mechanism that the 
neoliberal ideology claims to support and protect.” In this spirit, Hickel has also pointed out that 
“in the name of freedom”, neoliberalism has, in fact, reduced freedom. The concept of freedom 
has been narrowed down to the free choice and actions of market players that has appeared at 
the social level as an elitism based on market success. In general, the basic concept is the amoral 
principle that market success verifies everything. Summarizing the conflicts between neoliberal-
ism and democracy Travis Holloway (2018, p.6) has concluded that “neoliberalism has quietly and 
effectively eroded the basic elements of democratic government over the past three decades”.
The main function of neoliberal ideology is hiding the main features of the neoliberal economy, 
society, and political structure. In this period of neoliberal hegemony the ideological, or cultural-
civilizational dimension of neoliberalism, was also fully developed in the spirit of technocratic 
modernity. In hegemony building, the main feature of the neoliberal ideology is its hidden cur-
riculum. Namely, the advocates of neoliberalism mostly try to avoid using this term, they argue 
with the technical terms of economic, governmental, and policy efficiency, with various kinds of 
modernization in separate social fields: “The new way of talking about inequality, poverty and 
social spending consisted in a shift from normative to functionalist categories” (Offe, 2018, p.75). 
This is the best way for the demobilization of the losers through the desideologization of socio-
political and economic perspectives. The interrelatedness of these seemingly separate measures 
in one tight neoliberal system disappears and the code word for accepting these changes is the 
technical necessity. In the transition to the neoliberal hegemony, there was a process of constant 
reference to the idea of good governance, concentrating on the efficiency and effectiveness. It 
was, again, a double-faced process, on it positive side enhancing indeed the efficiency of govern-
ing in the separate cases, but also leading to the ideology of technocracy and meritocracy on the 
other to cover the systemic effects. The technocratic neoliberal ideology focuses exclusively on 
output legitimacy, with success in particular fields achieved by neglecting the complex effects on 
the social and political system (Buti and Pichelmann, 2017).6
Accordingly, the economic theory has used the neoliberal term, so has the media, but usually 
the changes in other social sectors have been introduced under other names by the advocates 
of neoliberalism. This “neutral” approach is the best protection for the various neoliberal socio-
economic measures presented policy wise separately in order to point out, in the spirit of Margaret 
Thatcher, that “there is no alternative” (TINA), since this suggested step is allegedly a technical 
necessity. They present the neoliberal measures as technical or scientific, professional, neutral 
actions, from which there is no way to escape, since supposedly these measures are evident as a 
common sense. The neoliberal ideology penetrated all social sciences and the entire public opinion 
6  The Gramsci concept of hegemony is fashionable, many authors mention that the dominant period of neo-
liberalism was achieved in this way (Eaton, 2018), and the counter-strategy should follow this “war of position”, 
gaining the field step by step.
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with a large variety of often competing versions of ideas and theoretical approaches. But first, 
after the chaotic period of the so-called overwhelming and ineffective state, technocrats proposed 
neoliberal socio-economic measures as the only rational solution for “the return to normalcy”. 
The neoliberal elites use foggy language and meaningless jargon of “Davos Man”, so the parallel 
universes of the “expert reality” as seen by professionals close to the state and big firms and the 
“everyday reality” seen by the men of the street have been clashing during the last thirty years. 
The “professionals” have claimed that they should govern the world, since they are experts of 
everything, which has resulted in the inflation of scientific expertise in the eyes of the average 
citizens who feel misled and cheated (Metcalf, 2017). The effects of neoliberal ideology have close 
connections not only to the crisis of “elite professionalism” and the loss of its creditworthiness, 
but also to the even bigger issue of the contradictions of the digital era with the “professional” 
mass production of fake news (Brand, 2016; Cupples and Glynn, 2016; Duménil and Lévy, 2016).7
Finally, the interrelatedness of socio-economic, legal-political, and ideological-cultural dimen-
sions has been very marked in the case of complexity management and good governance. David 
Chandler (2014, p.51) describes the transition from government to governance from the simple 
fact that in modern societies “the object of governance can be understood as shaped through 
determinate but complex causality”, since the governance process has become much more mul-
tifaceted and it can only be understood as complexity management. Neoliberalism offers to this 
emerging and deepening problem of complexity management only a reductionist answer: “Prices 
here played a fundamental role revealing or giving access to the plural reality of complex life and 
also acting as a guide of to future behaviour . . . The market worked here as the deus ex machina, 
resolving the problems of the limits of governmental and individual reasoning and providing 
indirect access to the reality of complex life”. The reductionist approach, concentrating on the 
direct effects of the separate individual actions, has led to totally “fragmented governance”. The 
neoliberal ideology has preached its sentences in the same way, teaching about the effective-
ness of separate technical-regulatory measures from the period of extending social complexity 
until the collapse of the global fiscal system and its aftermath. It has produced the tragedy of the 
global crisis, therefore, “This approach was subsequently rejected for its reductionist cause and 
effect understandings and reworked through an increasing attention to general complexity and 
resilience.” (Chandler, 2014, pp.53-54, 56).8
The political paradoxes of neoliberal hybrids in ECE
In general, the nature of neoliberalism discussed above is key for to discovering the internal logic 
of neopopulism, including its regional variety in ECE. But at the very start there is a basic differ-
ence. Namely, in the West the period of neoliberal hegemony followed that of the welfare state 
7  Marco Buti and Karl Pichelmann (2017) have deeply analysed the issue of loss of credit by the technocratic 
elites.
8  The neoliberalism has still been “resilient” to the global crisis to a great extent, since it has survived in many 
modified forms and even in the austerity measures of the EU member states (Schmidt and Thatcher, 2013 and 
Schmidt and Thatcher (eds) 2013). The current era of “post-neoliberalism” has been presented as the crisis of crisis 
management, including the reaction of the EU and member states’ governments because of the application of 
neoliberal methods in the global crisis management and afterwards like the strong austerity measures.
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with well-developed democracies and strong “self-defence of society”, unlike in the ECE coun-
tries, which were underdeveloped, weak, and vulnerable at the time of the systemic change, and 
therefore they were actually defenceless against imported neoliberalism. Originally, in the spirit 
of Washington consensus, the “advocates of neoliberal doctrines” declared the new “orthodoxy” 
that the free market would solve all problems in the emerging democracies: “The people of the 
country had been promised that once market forces were unleashed, the economy would boom”, 
but actually there have been “disastrous results” for the large part of society (Stiglitz, 2001, p. XII).
In the West, the incoming neoliberalism was built on the foundation of well-developed Western 
economies, societies, and polities, unlike in the Eastern semi-periphery of the EU with its underde-
veloped society, just liberated from the Soviet empire. During the welfare society period, income 
and consumption levels increased drastically in the West, which meant an extended, enlarged 
social reproduction, including the “knowledge production” in large layers of society. They became 
both generally more educated and more “socially minded”—it may called “citizenization”, i.e. 
acting more intensively as true citizens. This provided a strong resistance against the pernicious 
effects of neoliberalism. To the contrary, in ECE, both the knowledge production and citizenization 
processes were derailed more and more for a large part of population, since polarization mattered 
in both ways, imported neoliberalism met only weak resistance.
In ECE the two poles of market and society do not fully capture the complexity of these trans-
formations, since the state entered as the chief actor, which managed the transformations, hence 
we have to characterize the distinctive patterns of transformations across the triangle formed by 
the state, market and society. In the West, the neoliberal transformation started from below, from 
economy, and mainly the development of market forces led to social polarization, although some 
political measures of the governments also influenced the social situation in favour of propertied 
classes. In ECE, from the very beginning, there has been no “Chinese wall”, no clear and real sepa-
ration between politics and business, therefore instead of agency capture from below, like in the 
West, there has been a state capture from above by the politicians, governments, and parties as 
the main road of transformations. First of all, the winning parties, after the elections, have been 
using both the methods of conquering the entire state apparat—by dislocating or destroying 
the “checks and balances” system—and by colonising the economy and civil society by means of 
crony capitalism. The ECE neoliberal hybrid can be described through a series of paradoxes—“the 
strange bedfellows”, “the perverse privatization”, and “the impotence of centralized power”—that 
demonstrate the deeply controversial character of authoritarian populism.
First, the paradox of strange bedfellows: In ECE this transformation started from above, from 
politics, since the ruling elite introduced those measures that gave the strong state framework 
to the new neoliberal hybrid. Traditionally, these societies were integrated from above as state 
organized-managed societies and the systemic change as their “great transformation” has rein-
forced this pattern of the integration-reorganization of society by the state. The new elite was 
ambivalent about the market, or simply distrusted the market, but accepted the market economy 
as a state-managed market. Under the pressure of the foreign firms and their governments, 
willingly or unwillingly, a wide range of social changes were introduced by the state that can be 
described as a compromise of interventions from above with those from “below”. It has created 
the strong state in political life in combination with the preferences of foreign firms in economic 
14
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life, as an arrangement between the national-conservative elite and the multinationals. Despite 
nationalist rhetoric about economic nationalism, the political rulers made a deal with the big 
multinationals behind the scenes—often even giving them special privileges in taxation—and, in 
turn, the representatives of big firms tolerated the ECE hard populist elites internationally and, if 
needed, mobilized support for them in their own home country, basically in Germany and Austria 
(Book, 2018).
Second, the paradox of perverse privatization. Seemingly, this strong state has produced the 
dominance of “public” or national interest over the “private” sectors, exercised by political rulers 
who claim to fight for the national sovereignty. In fact, this new socio-political construct has turned 
out to be the rule of private over public in disguise, since an amalgam of public-private ownership 
has emerged, and therefore the entire process can be qualified as perverse, upside-down privatiza-
tion. The hard populist elites have been surrounded by satellite organizations as combinations of 
public and private, and they have exercised rule by both official, legal-administrative means and 
unofficial, covert-informative means. On one hand, the political rulers have “privatized” the official, 
public institutions by putting their loyalists there, since populists do not respect the institutional 
limits on their power once in office. But on the other hand, by blurring the borders of public and 
private, they have created pseudo-private institutions in all social fields. State run organizations 
have appeared in private masks, including state financed and managed private firms, media 
outlets, research institutes, and private security organizations in order to camouflage their state 
dependent workings and creating the appearance of their independence. The ECE political parties, 
without social embeddedness or genuine roots in civil society, have penetrated all social segments 
to fine-tune a governance that has generated a radical uncertainty, because these pseudo-private 
units have dominated in their own fields and disturbed the normal workings from the economy 
to the media or higher education.
Thus, two types of informal economies have risen; beyond the usual form of the small-scale 
informal economy, there has been a well-organized big politico-business network of politicians that 
has managed to channel EU transfers to friendly oligarchs. At the top of this perverse privatization, 
a new parasitic politico-economic elite has been formed, and due to extreme social polarization, 
“conspicuous” or “ostentatious” consumption habits have become widespread to show the high 
social or political status. It may even be called provocative consumption, the members of the new 
politico-business oligarchy who have used state resources as part of their private incomes through 
institutionalized “money pumps” that turn public money private. This perverse privatization as a 
tidal wave in the 2010s has remained a blind spot for the EU, although it has actually devoured huge 
amounts of resources meant for the socio-economic progress that has led to social disinvestment.
Third, the paradox of the impotence of centralized power. The overwhelming formal and 
informal power of the new parasitic elite significant contrasts from the low government perfor-
mance due to fragmented governance. This paradox can be formulated as the necessity of widely 
coordinated social reconstruction in the systemic change on one side, and chaotic governance 
instead of complexity management or “flying blind” without a clear development strategy by the 
politically over-centralized management on the other. The masterplan was the introduction of a 
neoliberal economy under the flag of liberalism promising, at the same time, the competitiveness 
of socio-economic management. Both failed, the liberal democracy has been fatally wounded and 
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competitiveness has declined in the global crisis. Transformations are painful and difficult, since 
they are the result of complex interactions. The tsunami or monster wave of systemic change has 
also demanded a transition from the old, postindustrial economy to the new, innovation-driven 
economy with a tidal wave of deregulation and reregulation for enhancing the human and social 
capital that has completely contradicted to the nature of the new political regime with its social 
disinvestment. Moreover, in this unprecedented social reconstruction, multidimensional gover-
nance as massive social engineering would have been required for the coordination of policies, 
but the ECE governments have been able to coordinate policy only within a very narrow scope of 
action. Thus, small policy corrections have become a standard part of government actions that 
have institutionalized the crisis management. This mass production of collateral damages has to 
be overviewed in political, economic, cultural and social fields, caused also by the excessive foreign 
ownership in a dependent, dual economy as well as by the voluntarism of the political elites with 
forceful interventions against a weak and disintegrated society.
In sum, the “polity” as the basic institutional architecture has been almost completed in ECE, 
but it has been radically weakened by the erosion of the checks and balances system, described 
above, as a special kind of “privatization” by the incoming authoritarian populist elites. The sec-
tor of “politics” has only been half-made even at the formal level with its fragmented, and partial 
transformation, since the parties have not established contacts organically with the civil society, 
but they have developed informal politico-business networks to penetrate the society that have 
resulted in political polarization beyond the socio-economic polarization. At the lowest level of 
the political system, the “policy” sector has become chaotic and controversial, with many counter-
productive and unwanted side-effects, so the socio-economic and political crisis processes have 
cumulated in a cultural or civilizational crisis with a much bigger contrast between East and West 
in quality of life and well-being in the 2010s than in the nineties. Millions of youngsters from the 
ECE countries were beyond hope and have been looking for a “European way of life” for themselves 
in the West. This mass exodus has proven, more than any theoretical argument, that the authori-
tarian populism is a blind alley, a fatally wrong answer to the challenge of the New World Order.
Altogether, the actual neoliberal hybrid in ECE is market-based but state-directed and managed. 
This strange combination means that this neoliberal market economy has been over-politicized, 
ruled by the traditionalist strong state, and managed from above by frequent, direct, state interven-
tion in favour of the politico-business networks. This neoliberal hybrid produces a bad governance 
with the unpredictability for most economic actors, but offers stability for the multinationals with 
special agreements. The “reductionism” or fragmented governance discussed above with its un-
wanted side effects and high social costs has hit many social strata and social sectors hard, even in 
the West, and has generated the eruption of anger in the form of neopopulism. The fragmented 
governance, combined with the perverse redistribution favouring the rich strata, has made the 
ECE story worse by creating a “national bourgeoisie”. By turning social policy upside down and 
working in the opposite direction of redistribution, a “negative” social policy has also entered ECE 
with a mechanism that favoured the richest part of society.
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The recombination process in the emerging neoliberal hybrid
Thus, in order to understand the basic combination of the ECE neoliberal hybrid, it is necessary 
to reconceptualise the systemic change as a deep, quasi-complete disintegration as well as an 
ensuing complete reintegration of the ECE societies when they were taken into the Euro-Atlantic 
camp. This process has been described in this paper with the concept of “recombination” and 
“reconfiguration” following the footsteps of David Stark who was an observer of these radical 
transformations during the time of systemic change in ECE. Reflecting on the explosive rapidity of 
the collapse of communism, and realizing that the changes were far-reaching and dramatic, Stark 
was very sceptical of the ideal model of transition in the early nineties, “capitalism by design” or 
“cookbook capitalism”, in which all social sectors were supposed to change in a complete har-
mony of social integration as the modernization narrative promised at that time. The “capitalism 
by design” presupposed an “all-encompassing institutional change according to comprehensive 
blueprints”. Namely, “cookbook capitalism is that the system designers and international advisory 
commissions who fly into the region with little knowledge of its history tend to approach the prob-
lem of ‘transition’ exclusively through the lenses of their own general models.” By contrast, Stark 
concluded that “we find not one transition, but many occurring in different domains—political, 
economic and social—and the temporality of these processes are often asynchronous and their 
articulation seldom harmonious.” (Stark, 1992, pp.17-18).
Against the dominant view of experts, he emphasizes that “the structural innovations that will 
bring about dynamic transformations are more likely to entail processes of complex reconfigurations 
of institutional elements rather than their immediate replacement.” Being an observer of the actual 
transformations on the spot, Stark insisted on the controversial, multifaceted character of these 
radical changes because “Seen from this vantage point, transformative processes taking place in 
contemporary East-Central Europe resemble less architectural design than bricolage, construction 
by using whatever comes to hand.” (Stark, 1992, pp.22-23). In this process of reconceptualization, 
he admits, “The terminology is cumbersome but it reflects the complex, institutionally intertwined 
character of property transformations” (Stark, 1992, p.46). Consequently, “The resulting process 
will resemble innovative adaptations that combine seemingly discrepant elements, bricolage, 
more than architectural design. We should not be surprised, however, if the blueprints of foreign 
experts continue to figure in the transformative process.” (Stark, 1992, p.52). Against the tidal 
wave of neoliberalism he also formulates the main point of criticism that “markets are but one of 
a multiplicity of coexisting coordinating mechanisms in modern capitalism” (Stark, 1992, p.54).
Some years later, David Stark (1996) completed his reconceptualization and described this 
controversial transition in great details with the—more or less hidden— process of recombination. 
He elaborated the theory of the “recombinant property”, meaning some kind of cross-ownership 
between the state and private property, conceptualized as the combination of opposite sides. An 
especially important dimension of this recombination is that the recombinant property blurred the 
boundaries of public and private and this resulted in the victory of the private sector in a very special 
way. These hybrid mixtures are viable hybrid forms, they are not inherently unstable or transitional. 
By the hybrid recombinant forms and initiatives “actors respond to uncertainty in the organizational 
environment by diversifying their assets, redefining and recombining resources” (Stark, 1996, p.997).
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Stark indicates that this type of recombination also took place in other fields of society during 
this period of “social dislocation”. According to the recombinatory logic, the discontinuity was 
counterbalanced by the reconstruction of the old elements in the ongoing social reintegration. 
By recombining resources in the relative normative and institutional vacuum, i. e. suspended 
between one social order and another, the entire society goes through a passage of transitory 
forms: “Change, even fundamental change, of social world is not the passage from one order to 
another but rearrangements in the patterns of how multiple orders are interwoven.” (Stark, 1996, 
p.995). This aspect is studied as “a social world in which various domains were not integrated 
coherently”, given the “multiplicity of social relations that did not conform to officially described 
hierarchical patterns”. The collapse of formal structures was combined with “persistence of rou-
tines and practices, organizational forms and social ties that can become assets, resources, and 
the basis for credible commitments and coordinated actions in the post-socialist world.” Moreover, 
in the “dense network of informal ties . . .  we find the metamorphosis of sub-rosa organizational 
forms and the activation of pre-existing networks of affiliation.” This concept of recombination 
has basically changed the usual approach of path dependence with its fatalism as captured by the 
past history: “Such a conception of path dependence does not condemn actors to repetition or 
retrogression, for its through adjusting to new uncertainties by improvising on practiced routines 
that new organizational forms emerge” (Stark, 1996, pp.994-995).
Stark’s concept of a recombination of old and new elements, internal and external effects was a 
big discovery, but almost completely forgotten or pushed aside by the approach that has considered 
the dominance of neoliberalism evident in the young democracies and avoided any analyses of 
heterogeneity and fragmentation with the unwanted pernicious side effects. The internal workings 
and the real structure of these complex changes have never been analysed properly in the ECE 
area studies. This concept can be a good point of departure also for the analysis of the ongoing 
“great transformation” as the present “transition to the authoritarian system”. The search for un-
usual terms to express the nature of this current process is equally valid for the present situation.
Actually, in the nineties, all social sectors changed radically, mostly beyond recognition and 
working according to the opposite rules and values as before. In the permanent process of decom-
position and recombination, “dual” and “plural” economies and societies emerged, provoking an 
often changing relationship between social integration and disintegration as a “precariate society”. 
This was a rapid process that can be qualified as a collapse, not only from the side of the political 
power of the former rules, but also from the economic side, and consequently, in every aspect of 
social life. The term transformation crisis has usually been applied to the nineties—until the rela-
tive stabilization of the main economic and political sectors—but the meaning of transformation 
crisis can be extended to a much longer period, during which the “Westernization” of the major 
social sectors was more or less completed. With its deep and rapid change, this was an histori-
cally unprecedented process, thus its direction was not properly perceived by the populations 
and elites concerned in an atmosphere of enthusiasm and naïve hope for a “Return to Europe” 
starting in 1989 with this “miraculous year” (annus mirabilis). Since the systemic change itself was 
something unbelievable, like a miracle, still it happened, people believed for a while also in the 
other magical transformations of the social life around them. However, the new system was built 
not only on the ruins of the old one, it was also built, in fact, by the ruins and with the ruins of an 
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old, century-long system. The transformation process had two sides: discontinuity-disintegration 
and recombination-reintegration. No doubt, a deep change took place, basically in the first decade 
of systemic change, on one side, in the concrete processes of complex changes the new and old 
elements have been combined for the viability of the new structures on the other.
The trend of recombination has appeared in all social fields, not only some social strata have 
been in an ambiguous, insecure situation, but the entire society, including the winners who have 
also been politically dependent, since with smaller-bigger changes in the political power and in 
their informal business connections, they could become losers overnight. In this age of uncertainty 
the ECE people thought, until the global crisis, that uncertainty was only transitory, but after the 
crisis they have realized that this is the very nature of the new socio-political system. This last 
quarter-century has been some kind of a long, continued exlex, extraordinary or exceptional situ-
ation, in which there has still been constant reference in the public discourse to “unique cases” 
and extreme circumstances. It is not by chance that it has been actually a “qualified period” of 
state or governmental power or continued state of emergency in many ways. The politically strong 
state from above introduced a system of crony capitalism, as a distorted market economy with 
constant state interventions, to support major international and domestic actors. The ECE type of 
crony capitalism means systemic corruption, i.e. not individual cases, but an organized system of 
informal politico-business networks with the government on the top. Both the build-up of these 
negative informal networks and the high level of systemic corruption are well elaborated and 
documented topics in the ECE literature.9
The ECE states were driven by the imported neoliberalism to the direction of the dependent 
development due to the dual economy of successful multinationals and the weak local SMEs 
(small and middle size enterprises) that has resulted in a dual society of the Europeanized and 
marginalized strata. It is easy to give both the model of fragmented dual governance in economy, 
based on the well-working Western firms making their compromises with the actual government 
and its parties on one side, and the dysfunctional economic environment for the other parts of 
the national economy on the other. Basically, nobody has bothered with the absolute and rela-
tive losers as the mass by-products of this politico-neoliberal hybrid. In this world of fragmented 
governance, the social consequences of political actions have been unforeseen, unpredictable, and 
unwanted that gives the complex picture of the chaotic democracy in the 1990s and 2000s, before 
the global crisis. Consequently, the ECE countries were not crisis resilient in the 2010s and the 
global crisis divides the two main periods of chaotic democracy and (semi) authoritarian system, 
or those soft and hard populism. In the 2010s, a tough version of state-integrated neoliberalism 
was introduced, and the new rulers tried to get rid of liberalism, or the liberal democracy with 
the rule of law.
Thus, the ECE neoliberal hybrid on the semiperiphery of the EU has evolved in two stages. In 
the state-managed neoliberalism—first in the transformation period during the rapid and perverse 
privatization, later by the (semi)authoritarian state—the social integration from above played a 
9  On the ECE situation see Ademmer (2018), Bugaric (2016), Buzogány (2017), Dawson and Hanley (2016), 
Dobry (2000), Easterly (2016), Jezierska (2016), Krastev (2016), Münchrath and Rezmer (2017), Orenstein (2013), 
Pappas (2018), Rupnik (2016). Especially interesting the recent debate around the Piketty’s thesis on the “unequal 
exchange” between the EU and NMS (see e.g. Piketty, 2018 and Bershidsky, 2018).
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dominant role and generated a special political-neoliberal hybrid. This first stage was studied as 
“varieties of capitalism” in ECE (Bohle and Greskovits, 2007, 2012), in fact, it was the rising com-
bination of the traditional strong, overwhelming state with the crony capitalism and dependent 
development. This first hybrid has undergone series changes with the oligarchization and with 
the emptying of democracy leading to a façade democracy with “the politics of appearance” dur-
ing the first stage, therefore the ECE states were not resilient during the global fiscal crisis and 
its aftermath. The second stage produced a much more mature form of the state-coordinated 
neoliberalism with extreme forms of neopopulism from above that has been represented by the 
autocratic politico-business elites. Obviously, Hungary and Poland offer the worst case scenarios as 
velvet dictatorships, but the other ECE states have a similar political itinerary with their crony capi-
talism and politico-business oligarchs, but are producing more shaky and unstable governments.10
The picture in the 2010s was that “Authoritarian-Populists favour strong governance preserving 
order and security against threat . . . even at the expense of democratic norms  . . . They have won 
government office in Eastern and Central Europe, such as in Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovenia 
and Poland” (Norris and Inglehart, 2018, p.10). This model can be called, indeed, authoritarian 
populism: running a strong state while preserving the appearance of democracy as a camouflage. 
The ECE regional variety may also be called “kamu-cracy”, or “cramucracy”, by maintaining the 
appearance, of democracy, a thin veil of democracy for covering the authoritarian nature of the 
political system within the conditions of the EU membership.11
The neopopulist social paradox in ECE in the embrace of identity politics
The global crisis has seriously hit ECE countries, and their lack of crisis resilience has made clear 
to their populations that the catching-up process has been a failure, so the “convergence dream” 
has evaporated. The emergence of the New World Order (NWO) has been the international back-
ground of this process and its impact has recently been reinforced by the refugee crisis. After the 
global crisis, many ECE citizens felt they were driven into an insecure, alien, and inimical world, 
and were neglected by the EU, too. Within the ECE countries, democratic political competition 
has been systematically undermined by the economic and media power of the politico-business, 
oligarchic, informal networks. This situation has produced more or less free, but regularly unfair 
elections with an uneven political playing field by the colonization of the public sphere, as public 
discourse, media and communication. It has culminated in the ECE neopopulist social paradox, in 
10 This paper cannot deal with these sub-regional versions of more politicized Polish and Hungarian case and 
the oligarchs driven Czech, Slovak and Slovenian case. Ademmer (2018) has reviewed the varieties of capitalism 
literature in the NMS and has concluded that there are two models: (1) liberal market economy, which is more 
competition than consensus based (SK and the Baltic states) and (2) coordinated market economy, which has inclu-
sive coordination processes (CZ, HU, PL and SI). Obviously, she prefers the first, directly neoliberal model with very 
restricted role for the state and other social actors.
11 “The story of cultural backlash can be broken down logically into a series of sequential step involving: (1) 
long-term structural changes in the living conditions and security which successive generations have experienced 
during their formative years; (2) the way these development led to the silent revolution in cultural values; (3) the 
conservative backlash and authoritarian reflex that this has now stimulated; (4) medium-term economic conditions 
and the rapid growth of social diversity accelerating the reaction; (5) how the backlash mobilizes voting support for 
Authoritarian-Populist parties and leaders” (Norris and Inglehart, 2018, p.14).
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which the poorest and most marginalized social strata in a want for security have voted for their 
oppressors, for the hard populist elite representing the richest oligarchs.12
At the beginning of systemic change there were two main narratives in ECE, the Europe-
centric-Modernization and the Nation-centric-Traditionalization narratives. The first narrative was 
imported and contained a rather simplified new evolutionary or linear model of Westernization as 
the catching-up process with increasing democracy and welfare combined, but actually the neo-
liberal modernization was in the background and it deeply distorted system building. The second 
was an old, homemade narrative in strong continuity with the resistance against the Soviet rule 
that oppressed the national sovereignty and cultural traditions, and promising now the restating 
the national identity after this “Easternization”. With some simplification, both narratives had two 
components, the first one was based on the combination of general legal-political Europeanization 
and the welfare-concerned socio-economic expectations. The second component was based on the 
priority of national independence—with the expectation of traditional ruling elites as the present 
“national bourgeoisie” to return to power with restoring some kind of the former traditional social 
and political system. Anyway, in the nineties the first narrative was mostly represented by the 
Left and the second one by the Right. Due to the obvious failure of the catching-up process, the 
Right has made gradually a recombination of these components, namely the Right by appropriat-
ing the leftist social message has combined it with a nationalist-nativist framework for the large 
part of population. In such a way, both centre-right and centre-left has changed their face. The 
centre-right has slid closer to the extreme right, so this recombination has become the political, 
social, and cultural base of neopopulism. The centre-left has been seriously weakened, since it has 
been unable to develop a proper answer as a strong message neither about the Europeanization, 
nor about the protection of social security against the increasing inequality and polarization, and 
later about the refugee crisis.13
The continued socio-economic crisis weakened the Left, its narrative about a Social Europe and 
improving welfare for the entire society became emptied and lost its credibility step by step by 
the 2000s. After the nineties a mass sliding to the Right—and later to the extreme right—began, 
since the Right overtook the leftist slogans and demands for better life, as well as the claims for 
solving these teasing social issues and protecting people from poverty. This success of the Right 
was due to the updated nationalist frame, namely arguing that the failure of the catching-up 
process was caused by external factors. So there was a combination of leftist demands with a 
nationalist-nativist narrative and soft, later hard, Euroscepticism. The mainstream traditionalist-
conservative centre-right grew more and more critical of Europeanization and promised protec-
tion for the poor and marginalized people from a strong nation state against external and internal 
enemies. While the governments have pursued austerity policies particularly harmful for the 
12 In the nineties Stark (1996, p.1019) notes that “the depth and length of the transformational crisis in East 
Central Europe now exceeds that of the Great Depression of the interwar period”. Nowadays a similar situation has 
created deep state dependence.
13 Basically, the conservative right has usually pursued neoliberal policies as e.g. Buzogány (2017, pp.7-8) ex-
plains: “Thus, ‘anti-liberal conservatism’ was combined with clear-cut neoliberal policies like the introduction of 
a flat tax of 16% (later reduced to 15%), tax holidays for ‘productive’ international companies, and a variety of 
measures against the poor like reduced unemployment benefits or compulsory public work for the unemployed.”
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poor strata, instead of developing a credible alternative for the society as a whole, the ECE leftist 
parties—like in many developed Western democracies—have been captured by the demands of 
well-educated elite. In the increasing economic nationalism, the Right has been blaming the Left 
for economic incompetence and being traitors of national interests. Finally, the Left has gradually 
lost its creditworthiness in this long, protracted transformation crisis due to its simplified, some-
times also technocratic-neoliberal, modernization narrative reduced to the evolutionary model 
of Europeanization, whereas the place of the pro-EU centre-right has become emptied, and the 
Eurosceptic, nativist right has become dominant.
At a closer look, in the nineties the right side of the political spectrum the traditionalist-
nationalist narrative was defensive but turned offensive with the fading promises about social 
security and improving welfare. This shift of political discourse from Left to Right accelerated in 
the 2000s in the post-accession crisis, in which the centre-right appropriated many slogans of 
the strengthening extreme right. Leftist messages could not offer real alternatives, so their mass 
support was weakening and the Right succeeded in imposing its traditionalist vision on society. 
In the critical elections, under the pressure of a global crisis, the national-conservative parties 
have become dominant in ECE with their contradictory profile of “leftist” demands for better life 
and nationalist-nativist demands for the stronger national state within—if not against —the EU. 
Under the pressure of the global crisis, the nativist-traditionalist narrative defeated the previously 
dominant Europeanization-Democratization narrative, and the national cultural identity issue 
returned with a vengeance: “what is striking in recent years . . . [is] how successful the right-wing 
populists have been in terms of being able to provide a cultural framing, a cultural narrative, an 
ethno-nationalist narrative to provide an explanation for what is going on.” (Rodrik, 2018, p.3, 
see also Lulle, 2016).
The global “organic” crisis (Gill, 2015) is a turning point in the ECE political system, hence the 
neoliberal hybrid has also been rather different during these two periods. In the first period of soft 
populism there was a depolitization-demobilization effect, whereas in the second period of hard 
populism a repolitization-remobilization effect. Namely, in the first period, the socio-economic 
exclusion also produced the exclusion of ECE populations from the political process in a special 
ECE-type crisis of the weak representative democracy as “democratic disconnect” (see Foa and 
Mounk, 2016). Soft populism was accompanied by soft Euroscepticism, with the relatively marginal 
role of extreme right and hard Euroscepticism, and based on a defensive and gravaminal attitude. 
Due to the desecuritization of the complex social life for most people, the socio-economic polar-
ization and the ensuing alienation from the EU, this process resulted in widespread apathy with 
demobilization and depoliticization. Although these emerging populist ECE elites have underper-
formed in many ways in the fields of economic policy and good governance, they have been very 
successful in the subordination and populist remobilization of the people.
The “magic formula” for the subordination of a large part of the population to a paternalistic 
populist elite is to claim to take care of people’s security in both “body and mind”, i.e. providing 
security in the complex process of desecuritization and protecting them from the internal and 
external enemies. These fears have historical antecedents but their present forms have been 
produced by the hate campaigns of the populist elite. After the state capture in the first period 
of soft populism, in the second period of hard populism the ruling elites have also masterminded 
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the “social capture” as the control over the society and “the capture of the minds” in the large 
masses of society by the nativist narrative. Hard populism has emerged parallel to the eruptions 
of hard Euroscepticism as the centre right moving to extreme right. The ruling elite has become 
offensive and active, based on enemy image inside-outside, leading to the mobilization of large 
masses. In this period of remobilization and repoliticization, the deep political polarization along 
the narratives has resulted in the hegemony of authoritarian populism, with the cultural coloniza-
tion of the ECE population through the “software” of media rule.
In this controversial process, the richest strata of society have claimed to be the strong pro-
tector and true representative of the poorest part of society. Paradoxically, the losers vote for 
populist governments, since the most marginalized and desecuritized strata seek protection from 
the state, while the government prepares means to mobilize them for the elections, too. Thanks 
to the radical desecuritization effect of the global crisis, the precariate has seen the strong state 
and its nationalist leaders as the best source of protection for keeping the remaining minimal 
social security for them in this uncertain world, although this is a “social disinvestment state” 
(Lendvai-Bainton, 2018, p.3). It has to be added that the poorest part of society has suffered most 
in the prolonged transformation process, both from the worsening situation and the increasing 
desecuritization, therefore they are the most open to the prejudices about the Muslim culture, 
or against the “aliens” in general.
This strong nation state is the chief actor in the ECE-type of neoliberal hybrid with various 
forms of authoritarianism in ECE countries. The recombination of state-managed neoliberalism 
with parochial nationalism has become the basic model for political systems in ECE. The domestic 
and international lines of desecuritization have met in the aftermath of the global crisis, and even 
more in the New World Order with the refugee crisis and mass migration. In the new crisis situ-
ation, the EU has been presented by the hard populist elites not only as helpless in the catching-
up process, but also incapable of protecting Europe against the “invasion of aliens” threatening 
European culture. In this marked case of competitive authoritarianism, the deeper the social 
polarization is, the more dependent marginalised people feel on the authoritarian state and offer 
their voting support for it.
Conclusion: perspectives for the “smart state” in ECE
In this final stage of this historical trajectory discussed in this paper, the “populism from above” 
with its basically cultural and nativist profile as the identity politics gets upper hand. The pater-
nalistic elite populism has introduced the discourse of economic nationalism with a strong anti-EU 
rhetoric. The ECE populist elites use ideological slogans, based on traditional national narratives, 
to veil their vested interests. The tradition of a centralized and strong state in direct or covered 
forms has ideological appeal for a large part of the population with statist ideas and an orienta-
tion towards government-led paternalism. Nowadays, all the advantages of EU membership have 
usually been pushed to the background by the ECE ruling elites and “Brussels” has been blamed 
for all social diseases of the democratization process, including the refugee crisis. 
The emerging New World Order as the Age of Uncertainty has strengthened this tendency of 
neopopulism, at the same time it has forced the EU to speed up its efforts for further integration 
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towards federalization in its social or cohesion policy that has created a counterbalancing effect 
against this authoritarian populism. Stiglitz (2001, p.XIV) in the early 2000s had already indicated 
the first signs of the positive model, in which “governments took an unabashedly central role, 
and explicitly and implicitly recognized the value of preserving social cohesion, and not only pro-
tected social and human capital but enhanced it.” At the member-state level, this developmental 
state—striving for socio-economic and political sustainability in the emerging innovation driven 
economy— has been called a “smart state” (Aghion and Roulet, 2014).
After the global crisis, the EU suffered its own transformation crisis, but the incoming New 
World Order has necessitated the next step of federalization that will be outlined, discussed, and 
legislated in the late 2010s. The first documents in this direction —like the draft version of the 
Multiannual Financial Framework (2 May 2018)—have shown that the EU has reached a turning 
point, since it has to rearrange the whole European architecture after the EP elections in 2019. 
Accordingly, the ECE countries are facing the choice of either drifting away from the EU mainstream 
with a false rhetoric on national sovereignty by actually defending their authoritarian populism, or 
joining mainstream EU developments by starting a redemocratization process and human invest-
ment strategy with a new model of “smart state” in ECE. The majority of the ECE population is still 
supporting EU membership and at mass demonstrations against the authoritarian governments 
across East-Central Europe, ECE citizens are waving the EU flag and young people are shouting: 
“Europa-Europa”.
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